Video

Introduction: Making Copenhagening a Verb - 2nd Battle of Copenhagen (1807) p1 of 2

Study Introduction: Making Copenhagening a Verb - 2nd Battle of Copenhagen (1807) p1 of 2, a Dr. Alex Clarke video from 3 Sept 2020, with 15 time notes. Topics include Battle Of Copenhagen, Danish Navy, Napoleonic Wars.

Date
Runtime28:01
Guide points15 time notes

Time notes

  1. 2:08
    The Continental System and Britain's Baltic lifeline

    The 1807 expedition grew from Napoleon's Continental System and Britain's dependence on Baltic supplies and North Sea trade.

    Chapter
  2. 3:21
    Parker's signal and Nelson's blind eye

    The blind-eye episode explains how Nelson could continue the 1801 attack after Admiral Hyde Parker signalled from the supporting force.

    Notable Point
  3. 4:20
    An unready Danish fleet concentrated at Copenhagen

    Denmark repeated its central vulnerability from 1801 by leaving an unready fleet concentrated in a lightly defended capital.

    Notable Point
  4. 5:16
    The Dardanelles comparison: adapt after an attack

    The Dardanelles comparison focuses on how defenders learn between attacks, making Denmark's repeated exposure at Copenhagen the exception.

    Notable Point
  5. 6:14
    Denmark's strategic bind and its naval consequences

    Denmark faced a real choice between French invasion by land and British attack by sea, but French alignment demanded naval preparations Copenhagen had not made.

    Notable Point
  6. 7:26
    What it meant to "Copenhagen" an enemy

    In this shorthand, to "Copenhagen" an opponent meant taking it by surprise and seizing the means of resistance.

    Notable Point
  7. 8:11
    Narrow waters, shore guns, and mortar ships

    The 1801 battle shows how narrow channels and shore batteries favoured a prepared defender, while specialist British mortar ships helped open the way for Nelson.

    Notable Point
  8. 11:20
    Gambier's experience and the Basque Roads dispute

    James Gambier's long service, support for education, and cautious decision at the Battle of the Basque Roads frame the later accusations against him.

    Chapter
  9. 13:58
    Cathcart's overlooked role in coalition diplomacy

    William Cathcart's later service in Russia shows why the army commander brought diplomatic as well as military experience to Copenhagen.

    Notable Point
  10. 15:37
    Cathcart's army and the weight of the expedition

    Cathcart directed senior generals, the King's German Legion, engineers, and 185 field and siege guns, giving the expedition weight ashore.

    Notable Point
  11. 18:45
    Why Gambier built the fleet around third rates

    Gambier chose capable 74-gun and 64-gun third rates for Copenhagen, preserving scarce first rates for operations elsewhere.

    Chapter
  12. 21:11
    A second-rate flagship chosen for command visibility

    Gambier selected the 98-gun Prince of Wales for its mast height and the view it gave him across a complex combined operation.

    Notable Point
  13. 23:00
    Reinforcements under experienced captains

    A roster of experienced captains and another rear admiral shows how much command talent the Admiralty committed to Copenhagen.

    Notable Point
  14. 24:26
    Third rates for Copenhagen's shallow approaches

    Third rates offered the strength to face likely opponents and enough handiness to work toward Copenhagen's shallow approaches.

    Notable Point
  15. 25:49
    Naval diplomacy before the attack

    The British force waited visibly through August, using the threat of another Copenhagen attack to press Denmark toward negotiation.

    Notable Point