Bruships 192: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Yes; Hood required her own reconstruction design because her hull, internal spaces, magazines, and earlier alterations differed substantially from Renown's.

Yes, especially for ships already in Allied ports, but political defeatism and the choices of the Vichy government sharply limited those possibilities.

The panel contrasts Giulio Douhet's vision of city-destroying chemical and biological bombardment with the much smaller payloads even very large bombers could carry.

Unified direction makes sense, but Britain would benefit from restoring ministers who are directly responsible for representing each service beneath the Defence Secretary.

A 57 mm weapon might work against small or shallow targets, but larger smart shells or a modern Hedgehog-like system offer more reliable underwater explosive effect.

Recent drone and asymmetric threats are pushing concept designers toward several rapid-fire barrels rather than one main gun.

The mixed scheme was impractical because the proposed mounts, structural loads, internal arrangements, and available deck space did not align.

Start with adequate dry docks, preserve separate SSN and SSGN roles, and ensure that a large frigate program fills the escort and anti-submarine warfare gap.

Roughly four days and fourteen hours, using R34's transatlantic passage as a historical comparison for the time and average speed.

Its strike mission is divided among F-35 sensors, Super Hornet weapon loads, ship-launched missiles, and Air Force support, while the dedicated A-12 program was cancelled.

Compartments can be made extremely small, but the useful limit is reached when access and operation become impractical; ordinary subdivision is possible on nearly any seagoing ship.

Very quickly, because the newer ships would reinforce Fisher's case for releasing the crews and budgets tied up in obsolete ironclads.

Operation Chariot at Saint-Nazaire, where HMS Campbeltown was sacrificed as an explosive charge against the strategically vital Normandie Dock.

Yes; an immediate alert after the invasion of Denmark could have mobilized the country before Germany executed its threatened air attack or secured its landings.

Probably yes in an F3-style design, because an improved 15-inch system offered fleet-wide upgrade and logistics advantages without the risks of the chosen 16-inch gun.

The panel argues that allied staff integration gave the United States substantial awareness and room to respond whichever way the operation developed.

It performed those functions through stores and pods, allowing a small carrier air group to adapt the same aircraft to multiple roles.

No; the Kidd was more capable overall, but the Type 42 was a successful lower-cost specialist built for a different Royal Navy force structure.

Canada's fit, general-purpose role, and naming tradition support the destroyer label, while the Australian and British ships are more explicitly ASW-oriented frigates.

Not reliably; Germany had limited mobile reserves and infrastructure, while the Allies could shift the landing site and concentrate enough naval and ground power against the chosen coast.

No; personnel quality may be comparable, but the US group has greater overall mass and the British deployment lacked its planned full escort strength.

Professional sailors can still lose operating time and energy when reporting requirements grow beyond useful oversight.

Germany would probably withdraw in the immediate crisis, but the political backlash and renewed rearmament could still produce a later confrontation.

Use experienced personnel as trainers and mentors, preserve detailed records through historical branches, and avoid losing the mid-career specialists who carry practical knowledge.

No; the Type 21 was a useful light stopgap, while the Knox class was a more capable purpose-designed ocean escort built in much larger numbers.

Danger depends on exposure as well as eruption size, and an Icelandic ash cloud could disrupt both civilian travel and military air operations across the Atlantic.

Multirole aircraft simplify carrier logistics and can deliver enough precision weapons for most missions, though peer warfare may revive specialized or optionally crewed strike platforms.

The Type VII leads in aggregate, but the panel favors the U class pound-for-pound because a much smaller force achieved outsized results in the Mediterranean.

A preserved Estonian minelaying submarine in Tallinn provides rare physical access to a British-built pre-1940 design related to the U class.

Talos required costly specialized handling machinery, while the emerging VLS architecture offered a cleaner and more flexible successor.

Yes; names make ships and losses more memorable, while numbers preserve administrative identity but reduce the unit's public emotional force.

Ports concentrate defenses and restrict the attacker even though they offer superior unloading facilities, so an open beach is often easier to seize first.

It is the British Berlin Brigade urban pattern recolored with Irn-Bru orange and blue, a hobby joke rather than a historical scheme.

Japan gains decisive superiority at Tsushima and enough regional weight to challenge American policy in Hawaii, at the cost of severe financial strain.

Its 18-inch armament would transform treaty negotiations and foreign building programs, creating an arms race that Italy was poorly placed to sustain.

The fatigue problem made such a failure foreseeable, but the accident occurred during a high-G low-level maneuver outside the aircraft's intended operating limits.

They would dominate contemporary cruisers and aircraft, greatly strengthen operations such as Dunkirk, and force submarines or battleships to become the principal threats against them.

It could be valuable, but only if implemented as described and able to survive the unforeseen problems that often derail government programs.

With a suitable powered mount it could improve later destroyers and carrier batteries, but the proven 5-inch/38 would probably remain on ships already optimized for mass production.

Assign her to Force Z, where 1970s sensors and rapid-fire guns would radically improve the force's defence against Japanese air attack.

Probably not; her machinery and hull provide substantial stability, and the lighter Worcester class offers a useful real-world comparison.

The panel nominates the Type XXI and I-400 programs because their late, costly development offered less value than more proven submarines or an earlier mass deployment.

Destroying an early German submarine also removed experienced sailors who might otherwise train and lead many later crews.

Germany would probably fail to secure Norway, lose much of the invasion force, and face Royal Navy attacks during any withdrawal.

The panel concludes that Cecilia Meux launched the ship, while Queen Mary attended the ceremony.

The Mississippi-based Greek ships would probably be the better-balanced and more available option, despite the Brandenburg design's impressive paper armament.

It avoided shipping lanes and surveillance while American planners wrongly assumed Japan lacked the range and shallow-water attack capability for Pearl Harbor.

Yes; the aircraft had already outlived their expected structural life by the late 1980s, and the airframes could not safely yield much more service.

Air forces used large quantities of comparatively cheap bombs to create an area effect, making the raid function like long-range artillery bombardment.

The panel prioritizes unresolved capital-ship and carrier conversions, naval aircraft studies, and experimental armored-vehicle projects that survive only in fragments.

Allied bombers could rapidly destroy Axis oil and fuel infrastructure at its source, shortening the war dramatically.

They would seek counter-orders if they could afford them, but the most likely wartime outcome is British requisition of the Chilean ships before delivery.

Start with Louis Leconte for the history through 1940 and Christian Koninckx for the post-1946 naval force, using translations where available.

Not at SSN scale, but a heavily armed long-endurance UUV could grow toward the smaller end of modern conventional-submarine size.

Exports to many smaller navies are plausible, but complete ships for the US Navy conflict with America's domestic shipbuilding policy.

Technically useful but commercially difficult, because port access, labor expense, and travel time leave aircraft superior for most passengers.

Yes as a training feeder: it must prepare pilots for Tempest, though it need not share the combat aircraft's design.

Either can work, but a dedicated garage or moon-pool arrangement may provide safer launch and recovery for larger mission-specific vehicles.

For versatility, the 76 mm OTO Melara; for a ship's main gun, a 4.5- or 5-inch system is more appropriate.

No; MACs added vital air cover, but armed merchant cruisers still performed patrol, deterrence, interception, and prize-taking duties that aircraft carriers could not.

Nearly all of them; even Warspite's rebuild contains details left to yard judgment that surviving plans do not settle.

Emphasize Renown's lasting capital-ship value and redirect Admiral-class hulls into large carriers, producing a much stronger fast fleet before the treaty era.

Once production models matured, they were good weapons for their wartime technological context even though later torpedoes were much more capable.

Not realistically; even a vastly more destructive V-2 would still be too late, too inaccurate, and vulnerable to the loss of its launch territory.

They were threatening but too late and too limited in deployment to dominate, while defenders were already developing countermeasures.

Keep the basic design and build continuously at scale; the Navy's urgent shortfall is frigate numbers rather than a need to reinvent the ship.

Yes, if the setting explains how a mobile fleet supplies production, repair, trade, protection, and every other function normally concentrated ashore.

It could preserve a dedicated fleet air-defence fighter and reduce the Navy's need for the F-35, provided the naval variant also supported strike and carrier requirements.

Twenty-eight for a literal one-for-one replacement, but the real number depends on the Baltic balance, Pacific duties, and Russia's desired global rank.

Yes, but the panel doubts Russian decision-makers would choose it, and the carrier concept itself was never approved or advanced.

A navigation standard could use the primary star's poles to define an approach plane, but ships should still reorient after arrival because real space is three-dimensional.

Spain would probably fortify it first, and the passage would transform colonization, trade, and naval strategy across both American coasts.

The underlying effect was known, but broader use would mainly intensify destruction rather than change the war's outcome.

Mobilize early, build a broad coalition, preserve useful line ships, and field massed carrier-oriented Starhawk groups rather than depending on scarce superweapons.

Use them to deepen ASW and general-purpose coverage, support uncrewed systems, and continue the Type 26 city-name tradition while giving Type 32 a stronger class theme.

Yes in principle; the panel expects France to export naval designs to customers willing and able to pay.

Eurofighter Typhoon or participation in GCAP/Tempest are presented as the likeliest routes; Gripen is another option but not an equivalent capability.

A noticeable amount, in the panel's view; diaspora advocacy can be louder than opinion inside Scotland or Ireland, where voters bear the practical consequences.

No; navalizing Tempest would drive costs sharply upward, while the carriers commit Britain to the F-35B operating model for many years.