Bruships 159: New Office - This may be quick, discord may work & I may not have a Pneumonia attack!

Modernised Queen Mary- and Lion-type battlecruisers would be most useful in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, or Force H, freeing cruisers and newer capital ships for more demanding theatres.

An 8-inch gun offers faster fire with similar range, while a 10-inch gun carries much of the weight and slow firing of a 12-inch weapon without its range or penetration.

Yes. The Navy valued volume of accurate fire and expected 6-inch shells to disable sensors and systems even when they could not sink a capital ship outright.

British capital-ship output was constrained more by armor manufacture than by the ability to fit protection at a wider range of yards.

The plan would use slow pre-dreadnoughts as a diversion near Denmark and keep the High Seas Fleet fast enough to swing behind the British battlecruisers pursuing Hipper, accepting the danger of the Fifth Battle Squadron.

British and American studies pointed toward landing-ship dock concepts by the 1920s and 1930s, with earlier ideas likely circulating before formal designs became viable.

Britain expected to replace its experimental carriers when possible, whereas Japan had a stronger reason to keep its existing ships in service.

The area formed part of a much larger storage complex, with stores spread across Portsmouth and comparable facilities around Plymouth.

They would have been useful command and amphibious assets for Norway, raids such as Claymore, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean.

They would likely intensify American anger and strengthen demands for severe retaliation rather than produce a useful Japanese strategic advantage.

They imposed much of the weight and cost of an 18-inch weapon without delivering the same striking advantage, making the extra increment to 18 inches more attractive.

A long-barrelled 11-inch gun might approach a 12-inch weapon at similar weight, but an equally developed 12-inch gun would usually offer better penetration and destructive effect.

The layout reflected weight distribution and the need to fit machinery, gearboxes, and boilers within the hull.

Possibly in theory, but its viability would depend on depth, protection, and weight distribution, while a roughly 100- to 120-meter citadel would provide safer design margin.

Britain faced broader economic pressure, while Lend-Lease terms made aircraft lost at sea less costly than aircraft retained after the war.

Keeping them would likely require a higher capital-ship tonnage limit, which in turn could let Britain build more than just Nelson and Rodney.

A stronger escort would probably come with a senior commander, more screening ships, and aircraft reconnaissance, giving the force time to avoid or contain the German ships.

Keeping the historical speed with that protection and armament would push the ship toward roughly 32,500 to 35,000 tons, close to Hood territory.

A uniform Warspite standard would be preferable because five ships with the same capabilities are more useful than a mixed fleet.

They carried people, supplies, captains, and admirals between ship and shore, serving as the main short-range mobility system before helicopters.

Both mattered: radar fire control improved the prospect of plunging fire, while aircraft were an increasingly significant threat, including aircraft carrying heavy weapons.

Yes, if the government had funded rearmament earlier; available yards could support more construction, but policy delays and even the dismantling of heavy cranes worked against rapid expansion.

New construction offered better long-term value, while ships such as Formidable could still be retained temporarily until refitted replacements entered service.

Probably not as a straightforward programme: the coastal weapons might not suit shipboard use, spare barrels were limited, and Spain's wider constraints made new battleships doubtful.

The required ship would approach HMS Hood in size rather than remain a simple enlargement of the Queen Elizabeth class.

The likeliest explanation is a wartime failure of awareness and carrier operating practice rather than a decisive secret mission, with Glorious left dangerously lightly escorted.

Perhaps six could be under construction, but engines, guns, skilled labor, and deteriorated infrastructure would make four at a time more sustainable.

Yes. Queen Elizabeth was the next-best candidate because she was less battered while still possessing a substantial service history.

It was a major challenge because restorers had to draw on retired specialists and reconstruct methods from incomplete records and inherited knowledge.

Yes. As battlecruisers became too large and scarce for all station duties, the Navy still needed smaller powerful ships for commands such as the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.

A great deal: shipyard land can become real estate or factories, and reactivation faces ceilings until cranes, docks, and other infrastructure are rebuilt.

Not with that light an armament. The carried torpedo boats are interesting, but the proposed ship lacks enough gunpower for its displacement and escort role.

Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States would all gain options, but four new Italian battleships would most immediately alarm Britain and accelerate British carrier and capital-ship construction.

Britain might choose a 16-inch or 15-inch design; a 15-inch/45 route could use triple turrets, improve older 15-inch ships, and share ammunition more easily.

Yes. Logistics organizations compete with better-paid civilian work and must make a credible case that service can support personnel and their families.

HMS Invincible would preserve a physical example of the first battlecruiser and a major change in capital-ship design.

Very little. The vessels were included in treaty categories but were not yet treated in the same conceptual way as aircraft carriers.

Henderson would likely have pressed for a second Vanguard, earlier Illustrious-class carriers, and more destroyers, bringing additional flight decks and experienced personnel into service before key operations.

It can be engineered, but the center gun complicates the mount and the extra bulk and weight usually do not justify the limited gain over twin mounts.

They offer appealing ideas about low ground pressure and crossing minefields, but skirt vulnerability and other operating problems make them a poor straightforward solution.

For an overmatch rather than a chance of success, roughly a dozen to two dozen torpedo boats would be needed.

Britain would field seven 16-inch-gun battleships, creating a much harder problem for Italian and German capital ships even though the Nelson design remained relatively slow.

Some British specialist yards, including Falmouth, could handle suitable conversions, although ship size, design work, and the vulnerability of niche industrial capacity would limit the programme.

Britain would likely pursue a 9.2-inch cruiser, while the United States might seek an Alaska-like ship sized to the new allowance.

Only if Japan also expanded and reformed pilot training; aircraft and hull numbers cannot compensate for a shortage of deployable trained aircrew.

No. A service would operate the more capable aircraft and direct development toward something better, rather than buy contemporaneous inferior types.

Small networked ship groups repeatedly run into the need for redundancy, capability, maintenance, and support, which pushes ships and costs upward again.

It would take the aircraft apart and study them, using their technology as a new development baseline rather than rushing them into immediate operations.

Henderson might accept anti-submarine carrier missions, but would demand stronger escort arrangements and would not tolerate Glorious sailing with only two destroyers.

Britain might build useful large armored cruisers, perhaps Courageous-size ships carrying about twelve 9.2-inch guns, in greater numbers than the historical class.

Investigators may lack both recoverable wreckage and surviving crew testimony, leaving only cautious inferences from the accident report.

Britain would field a much stronger fast battle line and carrier force, changing calculations for Japan, Germany, Italy, Force Z, and operations across the war.

They rank high for the appeal of speed, but their difficult balance of survivability and stability limits their practical value.

It could improve Italian strike aircraft, but the advantage would not develop in isolation and might prompt stronger British radar coverage around Alexandria, Crete, and other bases.

Possibly, but two incompatible 40 mm ammunition systems create storage and wrong-loading risks, so standardisation eases a serious logistics burden.

No. Converting Hood would require major improvements in subdivision and armor coverage, and the battlecruiser-to-fast-battleship boundary depends on more than belt thickness.

Factories had been tooled and supplied for peacetime orders, so scaling production to wartime quantities took time.

Their size could support larger aircraft and roughly forty years of service into the 1980s or 1990s; proposed names included Africa, Gibraltar, Malta, and New Zealand.

After a training delay, American carriers might gain the ability to locate, fix, and strike Japanese forces at night, potentially changing battles such as Midway or the Coral Sea.

Yes. LHD support for small unmanned surface craft is plausible, although no specific design is developed.

They would give Commonwealth forces a large early jet-fighter pool, strengthening places such as Singapore and enabling fast radar-controlled attacks on enemy bomber formations.

Her pre-April duties emphasized Mediterranean training and conditions where high-volume pom-pom fire was considered the better fit.

Topweight was only one constraint; each additional gun also demanded crew, ammunition, stowage, and supply arrangements within a carrier designed before the war.