1930 London Naval Treaty: An Introduction Part 2 of 5/Articles 8-10

Article 8 exempted small naval vessels, but used displacement, gun-calibre, torpedo, speed, armour, mine, and aircraft rules to stop evasions.

The six-inch limit on carrier guns closed off a loophole in which a nominal flight deck could conceal an eight-inch-gun cruiser.

Six-inch guns marked the point at which a ship became a dangerous cruiser, pressuring smaller navies not to turn destroyers into miniature cruisers.

Limits on small combatants encouraged competing destroyer philosophies, from near-cruiser gun armaments to rapid-fire destroyer weapons.

A destroyer's main anti-capital-ship weapon was the torpedo; fast-firing guns helped it screen friendly heavy ships and fight enemy destroyers.

British, American, Japanese, French, and Italian design choices reveal different answers to torpedo armament, destroyer guns, sea conditions, and cruiser firepower.

High-angle eight-inch mounts, faster turret traverse, and the Battle class's gun layout connect machinery choices to manoeuvre and torpedo tactics.

Article 9 linked replacement to schedules, preventing a navy from rebuilding its whole fleet at once around the treaty's new limits.

Article 10 required notice of a ship's laying down and completion, along with dimensions, displacement, and main-gun information that enabled outside scrutiny.

Treaty categories and replacement rules shaped ships that navies carried into World War II because there was too little time to undo every interwar design compromise.

Before proposing an earlier Pacific war, the discussion distinguishes a bounded counterfactual from an alternate-history narrative that follows one imagined path much further.

The closing counterfactual argues that without the London Treaty's modifications to the Washington system, Japan might have felt compelled to strike the United States in 1937 or 1938.