One potential customer is a navy that wants a capital asset for diplomacy and task-force command without building a full carrier aviation system. Automation could make the ship an enlarged extension of destroyer or cruiser training rather than an entirely new personnel branch. Its concentration of experienced officers and senior ratings could also make it a useful training ship for the wider fleet. A late-1930s Henderson-Chatfield debate over destroyers supports the crew argument: a somewhat larger hull can be easier to maintain with fewer sailors because equipment is more accessible and redundancy absorbs failures, until size makes travel around the ship a manpower burden. The proposed range stays at 40,000-60,000 tons because a still larger vessel loses access to useful ports, whereas this range can often berth at existing cruise-liner or ferry facilities. A larger-than-destroyer hull gains accessibility, redundancy, and endurance, but excessive size would increase travel and access constraints enough to undermine the diplomatic mission.
Chapter · 1:00:15-1:05:26
Who might buy one, and why size should stop near 60,000 tons
The concept may suit navies seeking a flagship without carrier infrastructure, but it must remain small enough to use ordinary cruise and ferry terminals.