A PBY Catalina located the Japanese main body on 25 October, after which the Japanese withdrew when they realized they had been seen. The Americans launched a strike, but its aircraft returned to their carriers as night came. Both navies had some people skilled at night operations; their weakness was the scarcity of entire units trained to operate together after dark. British night-strike capability supplies the counterfactual comparison. Either side with comparable capability might have struck an opponent poorly equipped to retaliate at night, although the suggested one-sided result remains hypothetical. The actual battle waited for daylight on 26 October. British planning also allowed for night strikes beyond roughly 300 nautical miles. Confidence in navigation made that conceivable, although finding a moving fleet at such distances is treated as doubtful.
Notable Point · 1:01:57-1:03:36
Night aviation required trained units as well as skilled pilots
A Catalina found the Japanese carriers on 25 October, but neither side had enough cohesive night aviation units to exploit that kind of contact.