Moffett's death removed a committed supporter of rigid airships, while his successor Ernest King saw little value in continuing after two expensive losses. One criticism of the Bureau of Aeronautics is that specialist factions could cling to particular technologies, with the dive-bomber faction offered as an example of influence lasting beyond operational justification. The Naval Aircraft Factory provided an independent cost benchmark for judging private bids as well as manufacturing capacity. Moffett's quiet coalition-building contrasts with Billy Mitchell's confrontational advocacy: in this interpretation, persuasion and institutional integration did more to establish useful naval aviation than public spectacle. The comparison with Hyman Rickover draws attention to the political influence and technical organizations needed to sustain a new naval capability. Moffett remained in charge from July 1921 until his death in April 1933, giving that work almost twelve years of continuity.
Chapter · 20:35-32:43
Moffett, the Naval Aircraft Factory, and aviation procurement
Moffett's long tenure, control of technical resources, and ability to persuade supporters helped experimental naval aviation secure funding and develop into a working system.