Cumulative carrier-tonnage limits, more than the nominal per-ship ceiling, forced Britain and the United States to choose between a few fully developed carriers and enough hulls to cover global commitments. Five large carriers would not have met either navy's worldwide needs, even if each individual ship were excellent. A timing counterfactual delays the Two-Ocean Navy Act until 1941 or 1942, allowing fresh wartime evidence to push the Essex toward a more Midway-like design or bring forward the Midway itself. In this reading, Midway returned to the larger, more protected carrier designers had wanted, while Essex simplified Yorktown-derived ideas for rapid wartime production. New yards and newly trained workers benefited from factory-like repetition, generic forms, and fewer custom welds that demanded scarce specialists. Ships had to suit combat requirements and the workforce and production system available to build them.
Chapter · 30:04-35:30
Midway and the cost of treaty limits
The Midway class exposes the trade between numbers and protection created by carrier treaty limits, while wartime mass production still favoured the simplified Essex.