Converting old flush-deck destroyers into fast minesweepers encouraged the US Navy to expect destroyer-like armament and versatility from later purpose-built sweepers.
Sweeping ahead of landings continued from North Africa through Normandy and southern France, while a Dunkirk experiment showed the danger of towing paravanes from fast MTBs.
River-class patrol ships prioritize fishery and constabulary duties, while Britain's small-boat industry preserves the capacity to build attack craft if needed.
Minesweepers could clear a threatened route effectively when observers identified the drop area, but an unobserved submarine or aircraft minelaying sortie left shipping exposed.
Motherships promised to multiply small striking units for a decisive battle, but the Pearl Harbor midget-submarine plan added complexity without placing force where it could exert lasting pressure.
Royal Navy small-boat operation and experimentation continued into the late 1950s and 1960s, preserving designs that could be ordered rapidly in a new war.
Special-forces raiding craft preserve part of the fast small-boat idea, but an armed CB90-type vessel is a closer modern equivalent to an MTB or E-boat.
American destroyer escorts could be built to full warship standards, while British frigates expanded production through civilian yards and reduced standards.
Submarine-laid mines faced heavy patrols near major ports, while aircraft-laid mines became easier to locate when radar sightings and signals intelligence revealed the drop area.
Leonard C. Reynolds's Boats at War combines detailed drawings with accounts assembled from people who served in the craft and the operations they performed.
HMS Belfast's early magnetic-mine damage led to a repair period that may have kept the cruiser away from some of the war's most dangerous early operations.
A Halifax- or Montgomery-scale explosion at Kiel could have struck a concentrated center of German submarine, warship, and possibly armored-vehicle production.
The 1,040-ton Spica class carried guns, torpedoes, mines, and 34-knot speed, placing it outside the unrestricted sub-600-ton category despite Italian claims.
The resources devoted to aircraft-carrying I-400 submarines could have produced more useful long-range attack boats for operations off the United States.
The Des Moines class could maintain its headline twelve-round-per-minute rate for a time, but sustained output tended to fall and depended on careful maintenance.
A large destroyer might physically accept a six- or even eight-inch gun, but 4.5- to 5-inch weapons offered the useful rate of fire and handling needed in combat.
Sending Yamato into more battles would not fix Japan's numerical problem unless it served a coherent attempt to seize Hawaii and force the United States to fight on Japanese terms.
The unrestricted-submarine-warfare charge against Karl Dönitz was weakened when Admiral Nimitz confirmed that US submarines had followed comparable practices in the Pacific.
Japanese planners did not dismiss American submarine skill, but they trusted anti-submarine capabilities derived from First World War experience that had since atrophied.
Japan needed specialized transport arrangements for Yamato's enormous turrets, showing that a capable factory and shipyard are useless if their products cannot move between them.
British armament works and shipyards benefited from long-established industrial clusters in which one supplier attracted another and transport links already served naval construction.