Hampton Roads and the case for turrets
Monitor and Virginia revealed both the resilience of armour and the need to concentrate heavy guns in workable arcs of fire.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Complete directory
Browse all time notes.
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Lissa, Devastation, and reliable steam
Lissa's forward-fire ideas lead into Devastation and the metallurgy behind reliable steam machinery.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Parsons and Turbinia seize the Spithead stage
Turbinia's unauthorized dash through the Spithead review turned Parsons's engineering into a public demonstration that naval authorities could not ignore.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Propeller testing and Britain's turbine industry
Repeated propeller trials and competing turbine manufacturers gave Britain the industrial depth to fit compact machinery into Dreadnought.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Turbine design follows the ship's mission
Merchant ships, destroyers, cruisers, and battleships demanded different balances of turbine pressure, speed, economy, maintenance, and cost.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Royal Sovereign and global naval competition
The Royal Sovereign class shows how mass battleship orders reflected a naval race that extended well beyond one rival.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
HMS Barfleur and the limits of pre-dreadnought gunnery
HMS Barfleur illustrates why stronger barrels and better propellants had to mature before battleships could exploit reliable long-range fire.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Seventy-percent ships and fleet availability
Several good-enough ships can deliver more available guns and tactical choices than a few individually superior battleships.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
French and British battleship design intent
Contrasting French and British gun batteries reveals whether a pre-dreadnought was optimized for battleship duels or a confused fleet melee.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Armoured cruisers as Dreadnought's design ancestors
Armoured cruisers developed the speed, range, and layout that made Dreadnought a scaled-up evolution rather than a design from nowhere.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Dreadnought built for speed and readiness
Dreadnought's rapid construction used proven turbines, available 12-inch guns, and an armoured-cruiser-derived hull to seize a strategic lead.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Tsushima accelerates an all-big-gun race
Tsushima made an existing direction of travel urgent, prompting Fisher to assemble prepared guns, turbines, yard capacity, and political momentum.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
All-big-gun marketing and practical technology
The all-big-gun label concealed older precedents, while Dreadnought's real advantage came from choosing mature weapons and machinery that crews could use quickly.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Dreadnought's cumulative revolution
Dreadnought was revolutionary because established turbines, turrets, speed, and heavy guns became a practical and powerful whole.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Dreadnought's ram bow claims a German submarine
Dreadnought used an old-style ram bow to sink a German submarine, giving the battleship an unlikely anti-submarine distinction.
From Trafalgar to Dreadnought: 1805-1905 Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc - Long Patrol ·
Taranto and the changing balance of sea power
The opening frames Taranto as a major Fleet Air Arm victory and examines the limits of what it demonstrated about carrier air power.
What remains from the Taranto raid?
A viewer asks whether any aircraft, ships, or other material from the raid survived.
Taranto and Pearl Harbor in proportion
Taranto and Pearl Harbor are comparable carrier strikes, but their scale, aircraft, and strategic settings were very different.
Why torpedoes mattered more than bombs
A question about improvised heavy bombs leads to the raid's preference for aerial torpedoes and its bomb-quality problem.
How a navy rebuilds institutional memory
A question about lost Royal Navy knowledge leads to the historical role of records, scholarship, and professional education.
What a mid-1930s Taranto strike might have required
A hypothetical earlier raid explains carrier air-group capacity, deck parking, and navigation before the final Taranto plan matured.
Shipboard and shore guns in Taranto's defence
Taranto's mixed anti-aircraft ammunition reflects a defence assembled from shipboard weapons and land-based guns around the harbour.
Minelaying against Italian harbours
The Royal Navy considered mine warfare against Italian harbours and carried out such operations at points during the war.
Cunningham's confidence before Taranto
Cunningham respected Fleet Air Arm potential before the raid, but combat success converted theoretical confidence into demonstrated capability.
A harbour-strike doctrine built before Taranto
The Royal Navy's interest in attacking fleets at anchor grew from First World War plans against Wilhelmshaven.
Why a parachute-dropped torpedo would lose the Swordfish's advantage
A parachute entry would require a different flight profile and surrender the Swordfish's unusually useful low-and-slow approach at Taranto.
Japanese investigation at Taranto
Japan's naval attaché visited Taranto and examined the raid rather than relying only on second-hand reports.
Civilian risk around Taranto harbour
The crews worried about civilians under the raid, but the available sources leave the civilian casualty picture uncertain.
Earlier raids did not create the Taranto plan
Attacks on Dunkerque and Richelieu were not the source of Operation Judgment; British planning already reached back to the mid-1930s.
Why concentrating at Taranto was risky
Taranto's concentration of Italian battleships made a limited strike strategically consequential in a way Pearl Harbor was not.
Why Italy concentrated its battle fleet at Taranto
Taranto was Italy's best eastern-Mediterranean fleet base and appeared secure deep inside the country's geography.
A raid both too successful and not successful enough
Taranto damaged the Italian battle line, but neither lured it into battle nor removed it permanently from the war.
How British torpedoes worked in Taranto's shallow water
A tension wire, stabilizing fins, and a precise release profile limited the torpedo's dive after entering Taranto harbour.
Experienced Swordfish crews after carrier losses
The squadrons behind Taranto supplied experienced aviators for later operations, aided by an unusual concentration of interwar strike expertise.
Why Scapa Flow was not another Taranto
A hypothetical German carrier strike faced radar, alert defences, and a fleet no longer concentrated in a supposedly secure anchorage.
Ark Royal's advertised strike role became part of the deception
Italy watched Ark Royal because Britain had openly developed her as a fleet-strike carrier, allowing her movements to distract from Illustrious.
Why Britain did not rely on bombs alone at Taranto
A bombs-first scheme depended on weapons the Fleet Air Arm did not trust and gave up the torpedo damage planners expected to disable battleships.
Why Illustrious did not fill every aircraft space with Swordfish
A one-carrier force needed fighters for its own survival, so Illustrious carried a mixed air group rather than the maximum possible Swordfish strike.
Would faster torpedo aircraft have improved the raid?
Avengers or B5Ns offered more performance, but Taranto's balloons, low approaches, and 1940 weapons made the comparison mission-dependent.
How Fulmars could support a larger Taranto strike
Fulmars could carry flares or a bomb and strafe defences, freeing more Swordfish to deliver the raid's principal torpedo weapon.
What happened to Taranto's missing torpedoes?
Five of ten torpedoes hit and exploded, one was found in the mud, and the remainder leave room for a substantial technical-failure estimate.
Why Fulmar fighters defended fleets differently
The Fulmar was not meant to win turning contests; it used firepower and diving attacks to disrupt bombers before they reached the fleet.
The Swordfish was built for this mission
Taranto rewarded the Swordfish's mature crews, reliability, and long-range night-strike design more than raw performance figures.
How Béarn might have freed a British carrier for the Mediterranean
Béarn was unlikely to lead the Taranto strike, but Home Fleet duties might have released Furious or another British carrier for the Mediterranean.
Operation MB8: convoys, reinforcements, and deception
Taranto was one striking element in Operation MB8's wider pattern of convoys, reinforcements, and distracting moves.
Why the Latécoère PL.7 and Swordfish resist comparison
The French Latécoère PL.7 can be compared with the Swordfish on paper, but it lacks an equivalent operational record.
Would sinking the battleships in deep water have cost Italy more?
Deep-water losses might have prevented salvage, but the Royal Navy preferred a harbour strike hard enough to consume resources without returning ships to service.
Why Littorio survived three torpedo hits
Littorio's survival reflected both protection and fortunate hit locations; a slightly different impact could have caused much greater damage.