Scuttlebutt 12: Not Pocket Battleships, No Guadalcanal and a load of Submarine Signals?

No. They were powerful heavy cruisers; their 11-inch guns and nickname did not outweigh their cruiser-scale displacement, speed, and overall characteristics.

Clips had logistical advantages but required repeated human replenishment, which could slow under manoeuvre or fatigue. The Bofors and pom-pom suited different engagement ranges and durations.

A bursting-charge figure changed between the source spreadsheet and the published comparison slide.

Less than might be expected. Specialist training, slow development of generalist commanders, and limited trust in rear admirals did more to produce overloaded vice admirals and awkward command structures.

The Essex program would likely continue, with more or earlier Midways and added emphasis on heavily armed carrier escorts rather than a submarine-led strategy.

Heavier carrier losses at Midway could postpone Guadalcanal, preserve American cruisers and destroyers for later battles, and give Britain more time to reinforce the Pacific.

Capturing Midway could force the United States into a costly counterattack while Japanese aircraft and submarines waited around the island.

American and British carrier differences reflected choices imposed by a 135,000-ton treaty ceiling rather than wholly different ideals.

Availability, position, and reporting delay were decisive. Submarines were useful strategically, but their contact reports aged quickly against moving ships and often passed through several headquarters.

The submarine-scouting problem becomes a modern lesson in why weapon speed cannot compensate for stale target positions.

No. Japan was usually competent and security-conscious; its repeated failure to challenge the conspicuous American signals before Midway was exceptional.

British V/STOL projects linked survivable dispersed air operations, a larger usable carrier force, and an exportable national aerospace capability.

Buying twelve cheaper F-35As creates a fleet within a fleet whose refuelling, support, training, and readiness costs must be counted.

The proposed F-35 nuclear role prompts a warning that tactical weapons make nuclear use more thinkable without reliably containing escalation.

The F-35C's range may favor catapults, but changing course late is far costlier than funding the carrier, escort, and aircraft numbers coherently from the start.

Probably. Giving Jellicoe sustained political support could have secured earlier investigations into shell, fuze, and armor quality, producing better matériel before the First World War.

Removing Fisher could speed the shift away from early armored-cruiser-derived ships, with older battlecruisers transferred to Dominion fleets while Britain built Lions, Tigers, and improved 15-inch designs.

Five R-class ships developed as 24-knot Queen Elizabeth improvements could establish a faster British battle line and shape both Nelson-class and American design choices.

The alternate fleet discussion closes with a methodological warning that history was not preordained and that even small decisions can redirect later outcomes.