Patreon 54: Torpedo development 1900-1939 and it's impact on destroyer design an doctrine

The self-propelled Whitehead torpedo gave small craft a theoretical way to sink capital ships, but its trim, range, and aiming limits shaped the weapon from the start.

It effectively replaced the Mark II because the Mark III did not become the expected operational intermediary.

Early torpedo boats were expendable because short-ranged weapons forced them close enough to be caught in the danger they created.

Anti-ship missiles largely replaced them because they can strike at much longer range and a mission kill is often sufficient.

Whitehead was not the only builder, and the Admiralty could use the developing ideas without owning his whole enterprise.

It was broadly parallel development rather than a simple one-way transfer.

The 21-inch size offered a workable balance of effect, weight, storage, reload capacity, supply, and compatibility with existing platforms.

Jeune École theory hoped numerous small torpedo craft could deny a stronger battle fleet access, but rapid-firing guns and enemy maneuver challenged its assumptions.

Yes, if the turn brought the torpedo tubes onto a valid firing bearing.

Methods varied, including bow launchers and early arrangements that pushed the weapon into the water.

No; the weapons may look familiar, but their presence does not validate the doctrine, even if modern adherents would favor small missile, submarine, and drone forces.

A flotilla could defend local waters, but Fisher made it an enabling arm that freed the battle fleet rather than a replacement for the battle fleet.

Fisher's torpedo boats, destroyers, minelayers, and submarines were an enabling force for a globally deployed battle fleet, not a replacement for it.

A discussion of Jeune École leads into why denial claims need credible combat power, alliances, and enough ships to keep a deployable force available through refits and distant operations.

Not in a pure form; its flotilla defence was backed by dreadnoughts rather than substituted for a battle fleet.

Do not let hostile rhetoric force an automatic retreat; deterrence must rest on credible, available capability and careful interpretation of signals.

Sniping, mass attack, firepower-supported mass, night sniping, and maneuver-supported mass represent distinct approaches to surface-ship torpedo tactics.

Yes, but Fisher hated war and cultivated a frightening Royal Navy precisely to make war less likely.

It can add useful defence, but a fixed site is not equivalent to a mobile Aegis warship and other options may be better.

A pair of torpedoes from a single boat offered poor odds because the target could turn before the weapon arrived, making simple sniping increasingly unreliable.

HMS Dreadnought received anti-torpedo protection described during the lecture as the best available in a battleship when built, reflecting Fisher's and her constructor's familiarity with the threat.

About 55 to 56 seconds, with the target able to start maneuvering before the torpedo was fired.

Early submarines were effective torpedo ambushers but lacked the speed to pursue a fleet, while surface destroyers could react and maneuver with the action.

Massed torpedoes could force battle fleets to turn away and lose formation, while torpedo-boat destroyers were created to stop attackers before they launched.

The torpedo-countermeasure cycle warns that weapons marketed as proven, counterless solutions remain hypotheses about how an enemy will react.

Scout cruisers, flotilla leaders, light cruisers, and the Tribal class carried extra gun power to suppress enemy destroyers and let the main torpedo force launch its disruptive strike.

Use them as leads, then locate accessible documents that independently corroborate or challenge the claim and cite those available sources.

Japanese destroyers used long-range Long Lance torpedoes at Tassafaronga, exploiting night observation and an American cruiser formation that did not maneuver enough.

Because it was a long-range strike at a predicted target position; firing many torpedoes changed the volume, not the underlying method.

It relied on high-quality low-light binoculars and optical systems, not modern electronic night vision.

Spearfish, officially rated above 60 knots and designed with the fast Alfa-class submarine in mind.

World War II destroyers used smoke, speed, and coordinated approaches to turn a single wave of torpedoes into a more difficult multi-axis threat.

Early variations recognizable as the basis of homing torpedoes existed by the end of the war.

Deck stowage risked carrying explosives in the open, while submerged tubes created hull openings that complicated torpedo protection.

They remain difficult; a rising acoustic decoy or a correctly placed explosive barrage may be more viable than a straightforward interceptor torpedo.

Fear of torpedo boats led a warship to open fire on fishermen during the Dogger Bank incident even though no torpedo attack was under way.

The Japanese opening attack at Port Arthur damaged ships caught without time to maneuver, but other torpedoes were stopped by extended nets.

The threat of torpedo attack drove destroyer requirements for the Grand Fleet, battlecruisers, the Harwich Force, and convoy protection.

German-Japanese wartime exchange was constrained by the need to move physical samples in low-capacity submarines through a hazardous route, not merely send drawings.

Not entirely; private companies continued development, giving the Admiralty tested designs to order when war approached.

British, American, and Japanese exercises tested large destroyer attacks and defenses, influencing launcher arrangements, torpedo fits, and far-eastern sustainment planning.

Within range, a hit still delivered a large underwater explosion and remained dangerous despite the weapon's technical age.

They evolved through motor gun boats into modern fast attack craft, which usually carry missiles and may combine additional coastal-warfare roles.

Axis forces often had more Allied merchant shipping to attack, so raw tonnage alone can exaggerate a performance difference unless historians compare available targets and deployment demands.

Yes, as did other treaty navies; definitions and exclusions let completed ships exceed the neat figures presented under the treaty limits.

Sundstrand is tentatively identified for the engine, while BAE Systems leads the renewed Spearfish production program.

The conclusion ties torpedo development to the technologies, cultures, fleet purposes, and strategic assumptions of France, Britain, the United States, and Japan.

Replacement work began early and overlapped: later Marks were developed and tested over years, with the Mark VIII program properly taking shape in the mid-1920s.

Probably neither by much; greater speed or a payload that divides into smaller attack bodies may matter more than a major change in diameter.

They score more early kills, and removing scarce ships sooner can compound into different fleet availability and operational choices later in the war.

They provide a last-resort return shot if a submarine gets close enough to place the surface ship in immediate danger.

Not fundamentally; the strike itself created the political crisis, while greater damage would mainly reduce the naval risk Britain feared.

Modern torpedo bodies tend to use specialized alloys rather than a simple ordinary-steel or plastic casing.