At Taranto, the Royal Navy could remain nearby with major forces in the hope that the Italians would emerge and accept battle; Pearl Harbor had no comparable Japanese follow-up force at hand. Admiral Andrew Cunningham kept his Queen Elizabeth-class battleships available in case the Regia Marina charged out after the carrier strike. An attacker seeking a later decisive engagement must weaken the enemy without making it so cautious that it refuses to advance. This leads to the video's conclusion: Pearl Harbor fits attrition and bait before decisive battle more closely than Kantai Kessen. The two waves bought time, but a third wave might have made an early American counterstroke even less likely. Japan needed the United States to advance before new construction made the fleet balance hopeless, so excessive initial success could undermine the baiting function of attrition.
Notable Point · 1:18:56-1:30:42
Taranto and the problem of damaging too much
The comparison with Taranto explains why an attrition strategy needs a weakened enemy still willing to risk the battle Japan wanted.