Taiho and the limits of improving one carrier

If Taiho had been built more sensibly, how much of a problem could she have posed?

Taiho was sensibly designed for the knowledge available when she was laid down. Remedying her vulnerabilities would improve one carrier, but would not overcome Japan's wider strategic disadvantage.

Taiho was laid down before Japan could absorb the lessons of its later carrier losses, including the need to remove aviation-fuel fumes from enclosed spaces. Calling her construction irrational overlooks the design knowledge available at the time. Better radar, guns, aircraft, or aircrew could improve her combat value without reversing Japan's strategic position. Japanese carrier operations also depended heavily on coordinated multi-carrier groups, making the performance of one isolated ship a poor measure of the fleet's strength. At the Philippine Sea, Japan could still generate substantial carrier strikes and its air arm had not yet become irrelevant. The losses there sharply reduced that remaining capability.