Yearly figures put the SM.79's wartime effectiveness in context without treating raw tonnage as a measure of inherent quality. In 1941, fourteen squadrons flew 225 sorties and made 87 attacks, sinking nine ships totaling roughly 48,000 tons and damaging twelve totaling about 84,000 tons. In 1942, twenty-four squadrons with roughly 307 aircraft produced only sixty attacks, sinking ten ships totaling about 31,000 tons and damaging three totaling about 32,000 tons. By 1943, eighteen squadrons flew 221 combat sorties but sank only three ships and damaged four. The decline occurred while independent targets became scarcer, convoys gained heavier protection, and British air-defence coordination improved. Wartime concepts often proved partly right, which forced forces to refine systems that worked imperfectly. Inconsistent fighter cooperation and stronger British defences, particularly Beaufighter night interception, made later SM.79 missions much harder.
Notable Point · 40:14-44:30
Strike results versus harder targets
Later results fell as targets became fewer and harder, British defenses improved, and fewer SM.79s remained available.