Security through visible, limited construction

Germany could enter the treaty system at a ratio of two, and the Soviet Union could receive the same allowance as France and Italy, although that might alarm Japan. The proposal is intended to make Japan secure enough to resist easy defeat while leaving combined Anglo-American superiority intact. No treaty guarantees peace, and the psychological argument is that states which feel secure and respected may negotiate more calmly than those expecting weakness or insult. Holding Japan down also allowed Britain and the United States to avoid defence investment, leaving them vulnerable to a sudden challenge if Japan rejected the settlement. A more durable agreement might have prevented separate European and Far Eastern conflicts from becoming one global war. Avoiding war in the Far East altogether is treated as unlikely, with only a narrow possibility if the treaty system served Japanese interests well enough. Permitted construction would sustain employment and reduce incentives for secret super-battleships while exposing industrial activity to other signatories. Some cheating is expected, but limited and observable violations are judged more tolerable than complete withdrawal.