A Midway-centered judgment can obscure Nagumo's performance elsewhere while Yamamoto's force-structure choices escape similar scrutiny. Nagumo had shown operational flexibility during Operation C, and his conduct at Pearl Harbor also deserves consideration. Nishizō Tsukahara judged Nagumo's background, training, experience, and interests unsuitable for a major role in Japanese naval aviation. That criticism may reflect Tsukahara's own claim to carrier command after service in Hōshō and command of Akagi. Japan had very few senior officers with deep carrier experience. The British example of Admiral Henderson shows how scarce such officers could be: he had been the first Rear-Admiral Aircraft Carriers and helped develop the carrier arm as Third Sea Lord, but died before the war. The ideal candidate imagined by later accounts was difficult to find in the actual personnel system.
Notable Point · 43:41-48:27
Reassessing Nagumo's aviation credentials
Later criticism shaped by Midway can obscure Nagumo's strong performance elsewhere and the scarcity of Japanese flag officers with lifelong carrier expertise.