The counterfactual begins with the contact that failed in reality: one reconnaissance aircraft found the Japanese force, but a second aircraft flew the wrong bearing and did not relocate it. The error shows that strong training and navigation aids could reduce mistakes without eliminating them. If contact had held, a British air strike might have hit the more isolated Japanese carriers, after which either side could have sent destroyers to investigate or attack. Japanese doctrine sought a long-range torpedo ambush, while Royal Navy doctrine aimed to approach undetected and unleash guns and torpedoes at close range. The result would depend on which force detected the other first, making this a conditional comparison rather than an easy-victory prediction.
Notable Point · 1:27:00-1:31:53
Operation C and competing night doctrines
The Operation C counterfactual contrasts Japanese long-range torpedo ambush with a British preference for radar-assisted close attack using guns and torpedoes together.