Can limited war aims contain nuclear escalation?

Why do discussions of war with Russia or China often ignore nuclear weapons?

Nuclear use disrupts conventional war models. Whether a Russia-NATO or US-China conflict could remain conventional is disputed: limited aims may encourage restraint, while defeat and mistrust may drive escalation.

Nuclear use can overturn the assumptions behind a conventional campaign, which helps explain why some war scenarios leave it out. Fleet argues that limited aims and mutual self-preservation give Russia, China and their opponents reasons to avoid nuclear use. In his Russia scenario, stopping an advance and restoring the original border would avoid an existential threat to the regime. The opposing argument is that leaders who started and then lost a major war might distrust promises to stop at their border and launch nuclear weapons to prevent an invasion. A further disagreement concerns whether Russian restraint in Ukraine predicts behaviour in a general war against NATO. These are competing assessments of escalation risk, with no agreed resolution.