How an early end to naval treaties changes the approach to war

What could Britain and the United States field if Japan left the treaty system and all three began an unrestricted naval buildup?

An early buildup could produce larger-gunned battleships and substantially more carriers, with enough visible strength to alter European decisions before war. British naval and air expansion would also put pressure on Army funding.

An unrestricted building programme beginning in 1935 could put British and American shipyards into full production before the historical outbreak of war. Britain could reactivate mothballed industrial capacity, while the United States had room to expand its production infrastructure. Without the second London treaty's proposed 14-inch limit, new British battleships would carry 15-inch or 16-inch guns, and both countries could order carriers much earlier. Greater Anglo-French strength might encourage an earlier confrontation with Germany, while Mussolini might judge Italian entry too dangerous. This counterfactual therefore changes the circumstances in which war begins as well as the fleets available when it does. Britain would still face budget constraints: simultaneous naval and air expansion would leave the Army especially exposed to Treasury cuts. Smaller carriers could support cruising squadrons and foreign stations while larger fleet carriers served the main battle formations.