NATO's large inventory and economic strength did not guarantee an ability to move and sustain forces in an actual theatre. Germany's announced spending increase could not instantly repair equipment, rebuild formations, or replace logistics infrastructure neglected since the end of the Cold War. Britain provides a contrasting example: its tank fleet is small, but it retains transporters that let the tanks move without wearing out their tracks. Across the alliance, combat units were preserved more visibly than the supporting transport, supply, and maintenance systems. Cost-saving also intermixed national capabilities so thoroughly that a useful force often depended on several members being ready at once. A five-year German recovery is judged optimistic, with the practical rebuilding horizon likely to be much longer. The increasing American share of deployed NATO forces is presented as evidence that many European members had lost independent expeditionary capacity. The closing comparison is deliberately sharp: Russia was struggling to sustain operations in Ukraine, while NATO could also struggle to move a major force as far as Poland.
Notable Point · 1:21:10-1:26:03
Why NATO's paper strength can exceed deployable power
A March 2022 discussion argues that decades of neglected transport, sustainment, and readiness limit how quickly European forces can turn budgets into deployable power.