The Falklands case illustrates why a fleet needs several imperfect but overlapping answers to unexpected weapons. A modern British carrier could bring F-35Bs, Merlin-based airborne early warning, and ASW helicopters, but escort and fleet-auxiliary availability would be the limiting factors. The much larger 1982 fleet could deploy south while retaining ships in refit and reserve at home. Military efficiency preserves capability whenever required, while financial efficiency assumes that activity can be scheduled. The Type 45 requirement began at twelve ships, fell to nine, and produced six. Because development and tooling had already been paid for, the cancelled later hulls would have been the cheapest part of the run and would have supplied reserve capacity for refits and emergencies.
Chapter · 41:22-45:15
Layered defences require fleets built for availability
No navy can counter every threat perfectly, so overlapping defences and enough escorts, auxiliaries, and reserve hulls matter more than commercial-style efficiency.