Kessen doctrine as an answer to industrial limits

Why did Japan plan for a decisive fleet battle against the United States instead of a war of attrition?

Its leaders hoped one victory would force negotiations because Japan lacked the industrial depth for a long war, but the navy never managed the total commitment the doctrine required.

Kantai Kessen was shaped by Japan's limited capacity for a prolonged contest against the United States or Britain. Japanese planners expected one victorious fleet action to produce a negotiated settlement. British and American forces were more likely to rebuild after defeat, a mismatch described as a Greek-style expectation of negotiation meeting a British and American 'Roman' habit of raising another fleet or army. The concept depended on submarines, torpedoes, and aircraft weakening the approaching enemy before Japan concentrated its whole fleet. Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, and the Philippine Sea never brought that total maritime effort together. Fuel and industrial limits help explain those partial commitments, while also showing that Japan had not created the material basis its doctrine required. The fleet was built around decisive battle without a realistic way to guarantee or exploit that battle.