Why Japanese damage control lagged in World War II

Why was Japanese damage control worse during World War II?

It suffered from lower institutional priority, uneven technical preparation, fewer prior shocks that forced reform, and an offensive doctrine that expected a short decisive war.

Two proposed explanations are Japan's narrower base of technical education and damage-control billets with too little prestige to attract the same calibre of officers as other appointments. A further explanation connects British emphasis on damage control to World War I losses and American improvements to combat experience between 1941 and 1945. The suggestion that Japan lacked a comparable institutional shock prompts an objection: it had lost two battleships to mines. Clarke clarifies that the argument concerns losses severe enough to change priorities, and treats destruction by mines as something naval officers already expected from those weapons. Japan's preference for a short, decisive war also favoured assigning personnel to offensive tasks. These explanations concern training, institutional incentives, combat experience and doctrine.