More carriers create an industrial reserve

How could retaining a relatively small naval air arm produce so much more carrier aviation by 1939?

Peacetime carriers and squadrons compound the aircraft, experienced trainers, engineers, commanders, facilities, and industrial capacity available for wartime expansion.

The numerical model is illustrative rather than a precise prediction, but its causal claim is clear: a bigger peacetime fleet creates more people able to train the next intake. More squadrons produce additional pilots, engineers, squadron commanders, air-group leaders, and training establishments before emergency expansion begins. The approximate comparison rises from 254 carrier and training aircraft historically to 458 in 1930, and from 348 to 738 by 1939, alongside about sixteen carriers rather than seven. That larger establishment expands the pool of experienced trainers instead of merely adding airframes. Treaty-authorized construction also gives the Admiralty a political argument for sustaining ships, aircraft, and the industrial base through the interwar years. When mid-1930s rearmament funding begins expanding factories and engine production, it would build from a higher peacetime industrial floor.