The danger of making a first carrier too complex

A first-generation carrier should not depend on an intricate system that has never been proven in the conditions it will face. Aircraft landings and launches impose violent, variable loads on a moving ship that land-based trials cannot fully reproduce. Germany’s limited naval-industrial base and long design cycle encouraged repeated interventions and increasingly ambitious requirements. Low-volume secret programmes and near-cottage-industry production could not replace the maritime infrastructure and accumulated skills lost after the Treaty of Versailles. In this interpretation, the industrial imbalance that shaped World War II was already established in 1918. Economic crisis and shifting priorities then kept the Weimar Republic from rebuilding that capacity consistently, while Nazi Germany diverted resources into the army and repeatedly changed direction. Years of engineering effort went into systems that the experienced British, American, and Japanese carrier navies had already declined to adopt. Their practice favoured rugged, maintainable arrangements over impressive paper solutions.