Any viable agreement had to include Germany, because Britain would not restrain itself while German construction continued. The transition from Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow to Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg meant an initiative would also have to survive a change at the head of the imperial government. The Army might support a ceiling that protected its share of state spending. Against that stood the Navy Laws, Tirpitz's risk-fleet strategy, and Wilhelm II's attachment to naval spectacle and Germany's 'place in the sun.' German participation would therefore depend on overcoming both institutional competition and the Kaiser's prestige politics. Unlike 1922, no world war had yet supplied a common financial and political reason to compromise.
Chapter · 30:15-34:09
Germany's army might favor restraint, but the Kaiser and navy would not
The German Army had a budgetary reason to curb naval spending, but Wilhelm II and Tirpitz had invested prestige and policy in fleet expansion.