Why earlier German construction would trigger a larger naval response

Could an accelerated German naval program beginning in 1935, with carrier construction from 1936, overcome Germany's disadvantage?

No. It would require visible advance investment, and Britain and the other naval powers could respond more easily from their stronger shipbuilding bases.

A German program delivering more capital ships from 1935 and carriers from 1936 would require years of earlier investment in shipyards. Britain and other naval powers would see that expansion and could respond from stronger existing industrial positions. Britain was paying yards to close in the mid-1930s, but a larger German threat would give it a reason to use that capacity for construction instead. Japanese expansion could then provide another reason for the United States to increase its own building. The later naval treaty retained limits on individual ships without imposing a total fleet ceiling, while the Anglo-German agreement tied German strength to a proportion of Britain's. Accelerating German output therefore does not remove the industrial disadvantage or prevent rival fleets from increasing their own programs.