Conventional deterrence is partly psychological: a government negotiates differently when a modern fleet already exists behind its claims. Seven recent fast capital ships, reconstructed older ships, and a continuing destroyer program would make Britain less anxious during the later 1930s. Germany might answer this material advantage with a submarine-focused offset strategy, but concentrating on one threat also makes German intentions easier to counter. Treaty rules limited a sloop's size, armament, and designed speed but not the number built, allowing Britain and the dominions to mass-produce anti-submarine escorts and weapons before war. Hermann Göring's hostility to naval spending would also constrain Germany's shipbuilding within the rearmament program. That constraint helps explain the historically small U-boat force at the outbreak of war.
Notable Point · 2:36:20-2:43:50
Fleet confidence changes diplomacy and frustrates a submarine offset
Earlier British rearmament strengthens political confidence, while a German turn to submarines invites a predictable mass response in treaty-exempt escorts.