Fleet Air Arm doctrine was constrained by engines and aircraft supply

Was the Fleet Air Arm's aircraft doctrine fundamentally flawed?

It had real weaknesses, but many constraints came from engine and aircraft allocation; two-seat designs suited the long-range reconnaissance and navigation missions expected of them.

The Fleet Air Arm regained control of its aircraft late and struggled to secure engines that received higher RAF priority. This forced greater dependence on American aircraft and on British designs adapted around what was available. Two-seat fighters suited long-range reconnaissance, navigation, communications, escort, and night operations from a moving carrier. Carrier beacons could help aircraft return, but transmitting also advertised the ship's position, increasing the value of an observer and independent navigation. The Barracuda suffered from an attempt to combine too many missions in one airframe. The Skua's effective dive-bomber role also shows why the fighter label alone gives an incomplete view of a naval aircraft.