Building enough volume for redundancy and resilience will not be inexpensive. Defense funding should follow the interests a state intends to protect rather than treat a fixed percentage of national income as the objective. The pre-1914 example argues that Britain applied the procurement strategy embodied in the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships too late to force Germany from the naval race earlier. The Washington and London treaty discussion similarly claims that disarmament made the Axis powers' chances look better. The suggestion that stronger treaty-era building might have changed Japanese or Italian calculations remains a historical counterfactual, not a demonstrated outcome. The strategic calculation compares the ship's cost with a conflict it might help prevent rather than with the cheapest possible hull. The same systems remain available to fight if deterrence fails.
Notable Point · 2:34:30-2:39:35
An expensive deterrent remains useful if deterrence fails
The relevant comparison is not whether a survivable capital ship is cheap, but whether it costs less than war and still contributes if war occurs.