RAF units were not permanently based on Crete until April 1941, even though airfields and radar sites had begun to be built. Four RAF and Fleet Air Arm squadrons had only about two dozen aircraft between them, and repeated operations reduced that total to roughly seven. Anti-aircraft protection was uneven, with the naval-base defence organisation supplying the heaviest guns around Suda Bay. One proposed alternative is to hide the surviving fighters, then send them against vulnerable Junkers Ju 52 transport streams instead of contesting continuous bombing. Strips the defenders could no longer use should also have been obstructed before they became German landing grounds. Scarce air defence and incomplete denial measures left British-built infrastructure available to the invasion.
Notable Point · 25:08-30:05
Air defence fails to become airfield denial
Four RAF and Fleet Air Arm squadrons are worn down to roughly seven aircraft, while uneven anti-aircraft cover and intact landing grounds leave the invasion's transport stream vulnerable but insufficiently contested.