Corsair carrier landings and accumulated deck experience

Did US carrier doctrine wrongly treat carrier landings as the same as airfield landings?

Early carrier experience had already established the differences from airfield landings. The Corsair raised a particular operating and training problem, for which British long-nosed fighter experience was useful.

A carrier's movement requires landing skills and procedures that an airfield does not. Early trials and operations aboard Langley had already made that distinction clear to the US Navy, and British experience followed a similar path. The Corsair introduced a separate operating problem: its long nose restricted the pilot's view, while the R-2800 Double Wasp required a large propeller and the clearance provided by its bent wings. Plentiful Hellcats reduced the American need to solve the Corsair's deck-handling problems immediately. British pilots brought experience from long-nosed Seafires, Sea Hurricanes, and Fulmars and could adapt their approaches to keep the deck in sight. In this interpretation, training and effective operating methods explain the Corsair's dangerous learning curve.