Fisher's plan appears dangerously exposed because the High Seas Fleet could exploit the Grand Fleet's absence unless Britain contained the Kiel Canal and German ports. Fisher may have expected the appearance of a British fleet in the Baltic to frighten Germany into negotiations. Churchill also wanted a peripheral operation, but he saw too much risk that the Baltic throw would strand or destroy Britain's decisive fleet. The Ottoman Empire offered his familiar soft underbelly and a Black Sea route for supplying Russia. Both schemes aimed to sustain the Russian war effort, one by opening supply access and the other by relieving German pressure more directly. They also reflected a domestic contest between the Admiralty and War Office for strategic control of the war. The examples of Ireland and the failed French landing in Wales show how talk of a soft underbelly could make a hard operation sound deceptively simple.
Chapter · 26:44-35:18
Why Churchill preferred the Dardanelles gamble
Fisher gambled on high-risk deterrence in the Baltic, while Churchill looked to the Ottoman Empire for a supposedly softer route that could sustain Russia.