Hornet's task group had 37 Wildcats airborne, yet radar direction, communications, and fighter-control coordination still failed to place enough of them in front of the incoming strike. American and Japanese carrier organizations had invested heavily in generating a full-deck or alpha strike, which consumed training time and institutional attention as well as hardware. The United States had useful radar and a practised attack system, but early-war air defence still contained assumptions that combat exposed. British carrier aviation made a different trade, emphasizing continuous defence and night long-range attack at the cost of other daytime strike strengths. No navy had unlimited resources or a universally superior system. Nominal funding for several missions can conceal a decisive imbalance in what crews actually practise.
Notable Point · 2:58:18-3:03:38
Strike doctrine competed with fighter-control training
Hornet's defence shows how investment in alpha strikes, technology, and attack practice did not automatically produce a mature radar-directed fighter-control system.