Notable Point · 3:16:34-3:27:26

Why written counter-flooding doctrine could lose to learned instinct

Carrier officers needed practical training to overcome habits learned on other warships, even when the correct counter-flooding doctrine already existed.

Notes

Jamie Seidel describes Ark Royal's reluctance to counter-flood as ideological; Alex Clarke argues that decades of ordinary damage-control training had made keeping water out instinctive. Carrier captains had to override that habit because their ships carried substantial weight high in the hull and had funnel routes through which a list could spread flooding between machinery spaces. The Royal Navy had suitable doctrine, but wartime expansion left limited time to give every officer practical carrier experience or specialist instruction. Some senior officers had served longer than aircraft carriers had existed, and many had never served aboard one. Because damage control must begin within minutes, reading a doctrine book could not substitute for drills that made the appropriate response automatic.