Did the Jeune École win by forcing defensive spending?

Did the Jeune École succeed economically by forcing battleships to add secondary and tertiary batteries before building specialized escorts?

The reply argues that those defences defeated the narrow strategy, while torpedo boats and their destroyer descendants found lasting roles within balanced fleets.

The objection counts the defender's extra guns as a cost imposed by cheap attacking craft. In the response, the more consequential cost fell on navies that had to restore conventional fleet capabilities after their narrow approach failed. Secondary and tertiary weapons already existed aboard warships, with the torpedo threat increasing their numbers. Destroyers combined defence against torpedo craft with an ability to attack the enemy, which made them useful members of a mixed force. A distinction is also drawn between the Jeune École's military ideas and the simplified promises promoted in politics and the press. Singapore's Independence-class patrol vessels illustrate the geographical exception: a small-craft force can be particularly useful beside a major maritime chokepoint, although Singapore also operates larger warships.