When has a risk-fleet strategy worked?
A weaker fleet can deny an opponent freedom of action without fighting, but the strategy works only while its surviving force remains a credible threat.
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Why Beatty may have fitted a Mediterranean command
Beatty's political instincts and independent command style may have suited the Mediterranean better than the coordination demanded by the Grand Fleet.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Horace Hood as the Grand Fleet's battlecruiser commander
Hood's public standing, Belgian-coast command, and demanding staff culture support the case for placing him over the Grand Fleet's battlecruisers.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Why Beatty was not next in line for the Grand Fleet
The Grand Fleet's succession arrangements placed other senior officers ahead of Beatty despite his own expectations.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Rozhestvensky and the achievement hidden by Tsushima
The voyage of Russia's Second and Third Pacific Squadrons is treated as a major logistical feat despite their defeat at Tsushima.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Kimmel's scouting-force background and carrier-raid plans
Kimmel's cruiser, carrier, and logistics experience continued to shape early Pacific carrier operations after Pearl Harbor.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Kimmel's possible return under a subordinate carrier command
A subordinate carrier command could have preserved Kimmel's experience while still satisfying the political need for accountability after Pearl Harbor.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Medina Sidonia's administrative strengths and Armada command
The Spanish Armada commander is recast as a capable administrator who should have helped build the expedition before being asked to lead it.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Rank could not replace Medina Sidonia's missing naval preparation
Medina Sidonia had the status to deal with Philip II and Alexander Farnese, but not the operational background needed to challenge or coordinate them effectively.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
How institutions create command mismatches
Senior officers can be set up to fail when a service changes their career path without supplying the knowledge or experience the new role demands.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Karel Doorman and the impossible ABDA command burden
Doorman was an able Dutch admiral handed a fleet-scale assignment without the staff or flagship capacity that such a command required.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Why flagship accommodation was an operational capability
Prince of Wales, Lion, and Tiger show how staff offices and communications spaces could determine which ship was able to command a fleet.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
ABDA had ships from four governments but no common fleet system
Four governments, three training systems, several languages, and three supply chains left Doorman's small staff trying to create a fleet while already fighting one.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Doorman, Dutch naval aviation, and an East Indies carrier
Doorman's aviation advocacy opens a counterfactual about whether the Netherlands could have built a domestic carrier more readily than a battlecruiser.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Lütjens belonged with destroyers and light forces
Lütjens's destroyer expertise could have rebuilt German escorts or directed light forces instead of accompanying Bismarck.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Why an admiral aboard Bismarck created command risk
Admiral-level accountability encouraged communications that worked against the secrecy needed by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Ali Pasha brought land-command instincts to Lepanto
The Ottoman sultan's trust in Ali Pasha as a soldier and governor placed a land commander at the head of a galley fleet.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Lepanto's flagship duel made command experience decisive
Ali Pasha reduced Lepanto's center to a direct boarding contest whose outcome broke Ottoman morale and exposed the limits of his fleet experience.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Why senior command still depends on service expertise
Combining senior service roles may look efficient, but it can discard the accumulated expertise needed to command fleets and land formations.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Vitgeft, Port Arthur, and the forced Yellow Sea sortie
Vitgeft opposed an early sortie from Port Arthur but lacked the seniority to defeat pressure from Viceroy Alexeyev and the tsar.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Vitgeft's alternatives at Port Arthur
Artillery command or a later winter breakout might have used Vitgeft's skills better than a sortie one week into the siege.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Vitgeft could have served as Rozhestvensky's theatre adviser
Sending Vitgeft to the approaching Russian fleet would have supplied a proven second-in-command with knowledge of Port Arthur and the Pacific theatre.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
Specialists can be misassigned at every naval rank
Cruiser, destroyer, mine-warfare, and battleship examples show that the wrong-job problem extends beyond famous fleet admirals.
From Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral ·
BJ Armstrong on applied naval history and education
Operational naval service informs historical research, officer education, and professional study aboard ships.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Teaching officers how to read and lead wardroom seminars
Developing the Naval Mind gives wardrooms methods for reading and discussion alongside short historical articles that officers can study together.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Museum work teaches historians how public history functions
Directing the US Naval Academy Museum offers experience of institutional priorities and public interpretation alongside historical research.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
How would Mahan approach today's naval affairs?
Contemporary parallels with Mahan's naval writing depend on preserving the historical context of his arguments.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Applied history should produce better questions
Applied history uses past experience to improve questions and judgment while preserving the differences between historical and contemporary circumstances.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
What Mahan would recognize in China and sea blindness
China's maritime rise and continuing sea blindness provide contemporary parallels with Mahan's writing about Asian power and America's outward outlook.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Mahan separated technological change from strategic purpose
Mahan expected new technology to transform tactics while leaving many strategic questions relevant, and his wireless discussion explored how dispersed fleets could reconcentrate.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Presentism and new labels can conceal older strategic ideas
New terminology and technological presentism can encourage readers to dismiss older strategic ideas before examining what those ideas actually explain.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Why Corbett is often easier to read than Mahan
Corbett's more accessible prose can give students a clearer first reading, while Mahan often requires patience to locate the argument.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Mahan and Corbett wrote for opposite naval problems
Mahan and Corbett often agree on strategy, but their backgrounds and audiences made them emphasize different parts of the same naval problem.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
The continental United States that Mahan asked to look outward
Mahan's emphasis on fleets and decisive battle answered the needs of a small post-Civil War navy and a country reaching the end of its continental frontier.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Structured disagreement reveals where Mahan and Corbett agree
A deliberately adversarial seminar can lead students beyond the easy Mahan-versus-Corbett binary when it ends in close comparison of their arguments.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
How historians present a strong inference without claiming proof
An unresolved British carrier-design question shows how converging archival clues can support a careful hypothesis without becoming a documented fact.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Mahan as a modern public communicator
Mahan's public writing and need for income suggest a ready place in modern television and podcasts, while Corbett worked through private institutional influence.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Mahan's religion complicates a simple account of his racial views
Mahan's Episcopal reform work and correspondence with Booker T. Washington complicate the account of his racial views.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Why navies struggle to explain their value
Naval communication often assumes that citizens share sailors' experience of the sea, leaving the public value of a navy unexplained.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Ports and undersea cables connect maritime security to daily life
Port disruption and damaged seabed cables show how maritime security affects shopping, prices, and digital connections.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Why naval experts and broadcasters skip essential explanations
A broadcaster's fear of appearing uninformed and an expert's fear of patronising listeners can both prevent useful explanations of naval affairs.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Public-facing history and the future of the field
Historians must explain foundational material and build routes to audiences beyond specialists if naval history is to remain useful and sustainable.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Cruiser roles and the changing meaning of frigate
Cruising duties and Fisher's proposed frigate terminology illustrate why ship names need to be read in their historical context.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Fleet Problem IX revealed both carrier power and vulnerability
The 1929 Fleet Problem IX demonstrated that a carrier could deliver a decisive surprise strike and then be destroyed when left without adequate protection.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Carrier endurance depends on logistics and adaptation
Carriers retain value because their air power can be replenished at sea, while their designs have repeatedly adapted to geography, damage tolerance, and changing aircraft.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
Uncrewed aircraft size still depends on the mission
An uncrewed aircraft's mission determines the size of the aircraft and the ship needed to operate it in this forecast of future naval aviation.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
British carrier armour and the distance to repair yards
British armoured carriers traded some aircraft capacity for a better chance of remaining operational far from the repair facilities available in Britain.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·
The carrier debate is also an air-wing and maintenance debate
A carrier cannot be assessed apart from its changing air wing, and its combat value disappears if maintenance and logistics cannot keep aircraft operational.
From Prof Capt Armstrong & Dr C Discuss the value of Mahan, Corbett & Sims today? #2Historians Ep 6 ·