States receive from a treaty or alliance only the capabilities they are willing to put into it. Interwar naval treaties did not prevent unlimited construction of slower sloops below 2,000 tons that were well suited to anti-submarine work, yet no power built enough for a major war. Alliance membership likewise does not automatically cover every national territory, contingency, or political choice. A government must identify the risks outside collective guarantees and decide whether to retain carriers, amphibious ships, submarines, destroyers, frigates, or cruisers for them. That means owning the hulls and sustaining the people and infrastructure needed to build, crew, maintain, and operate them. The Falklands example demonstrates why an ally's theoretical strength cannot substitute for a national capability when the ally does not join the operation.
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Alliances do not replace national capabilities
Treaties and alliances provide only the security their members fund, and a state must retain ships for territories and operations that collective commitments do not reliably cover.