Churchill's new chairmanship of the defence committee gave him de facto coordination authority, and he ordered Operation Wilfred before completing the permission process. Britain and France then notified Norway that they reserved the right to deny Germany Norwegian resources, yet Norway still did not fully mobilise. A Copenhagen report that ten German destroyers were heading toward Narvik was discounted because their route had supposedly been watched. RAF reconnaissance saw German warships at sea, but Britain interpreted them as a North Atlantic sortie and missed that some carried troops while supply ships had sailed separately. The Home Fleet moved north, but the warning picture remained incomplete. The Polish submarine ORP Orzeł's sinking of the German transport Rio de Janeiro off southern Norway supplied another naval contact on the eve of invasion.
Notable Point · 10:24-15:40
Warnings that did not become readiness
Norway and Britain received warning signs before the invasion, but incomplete mobilisation and misread naval movements left the initiative with Germany.