Chapter ยท 3:30:50-3:35:58

War Memorandum Eastern as preparation strategy

Andrew Field's study shows how interwar planners translated a possible war with Japan into fleet, base, trade-protection, and logistics requirements.

Notes

The reading distinguishes war strategy, which directs actual forces against a known enemy, from preparation strategy, which must build forces and bases before the crisis exists. War Memorandum Eastern translated a possible conflict with Japan into peacetime requirements for ships, Singapore, repair capacity, fuel, and other logistical support. Planners understood that paper fleet totals mattered less than the strength that could be deployed and sustained far from home. A delay of as much as ninety days before the main British fleet arrived made existing cruisers and the Royal Australian Navy central to protecting imperial trade. The strategic aim was to contain the Japanese fleet and cut Japan's external communications rather than invade the home islands. The plan also exposed risky assumptions, including treating the Army and RAF mainly as providers of forces and discounting the possibility of successful landings against Singapore or Australia.