Why a CIC did not make the U.S. Navy expert at night fighting

Why was the U.S. Navy still weak in some 1942-43 night battles despite introducing combat information centres?

Training priorities, budgets, and repeated battle-group practice mattered as much as equipment, and the U.S. Navy had emphasized other tasks between the wars.

Sailing at night requires different experience from coordinating a battle group in a night action. Combat information centres could not supply the practice, doctrine, or training budget needed to build that collective skill. British preparation is connected to the determination to prevent a repeat of the German escape at Jutland and to a preference for close fighting. A reminder of Japanese night-fighting proficiency qualifies the initial emphasis on the Royal Navy, with Japanese preparation distinguished by its focus on torpedo attacks. Dutch ships that escaped and later fought with Britain are also an uneven sample, including both ships trained by the Royal Navy and crews already experimenting with night tactics. Different interwar priorities are offered as the explanation for the American training gap.