In the war's first six weeks, Germany had sent out only ten submarines, lost two, and sunk no ships, so the threat looked operationally unproven. At 06:00 on 22 September, the three cruisers were patrolling at ten knots in line abreast, roughly two nautical miles apart, with periscope lookouts posted and guns crewed. Kapitänleutnant Otto Weddigen's U-9 surfaced after sheltering from the storm, sighted the formation, and hit Aboukir from about 550 yards. Because no submarine was seen, Captain Drummond assumed a mine strike and ordered Hogue and Cressy to close for rescue. U-9 then hit Hogue from roughly 300 yards, briefly exposed its bow under gunfire, and attacked Cressy after she tried to ram and then turned back toward survivors. The short ranges, failed steam-powered lifeboat winches, and instinct to help men in the water show how familiar rescue practice and limited information compounded the effect of a new weapon.
Chapter · 1:21:17-1:25:48
How U-9 sank Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy
U-9 exploited short firing ranges and the cruisers' rescue response after officers initially interpreted Aboukir's explosion as a mine strike.