Japan could eliminate Russia's First Pacific Squadron and then the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima because it faced a smaller naval system with limited commitment to continue. Applying that model to Britain or the United States required destroying several times as many capital ships and still confronting replacement fleets. Earlier British losses during the Anglo-Dutch and French wars had not ended the Royal Navy's willingness to return. Force Z illustrates the same problem in 1941: its loss did not give Japan lasting control of the Indian Ocean because Somerville soon arrived with another British force. Only a separate crisis severe enough to make Washington abandon the Pacific offered a plausible escape from that imbalance; another fleet victory alone did not.
Notable Point · 3:08:57-3:15:13
Why Tsushima was the wrong scale model
The final comparison explains why destroying Russia's Pacific fleets in 1904-05 did not provide a usable model for defeating the much deeper British or American navies.