The battle confirmed rather than originated much of the thinking behind HMS Dreadnought, whose design work and long-lead orders were already advanced by May 1905. Percy Scott, William Sims, Vittorio Cuniberti, and others had already shaped the gunnery and capital-ship debate before the battle supplied dramatic evidence. Critics nevertheless used Japan's six-knot advantage to argue that Dreadnought's 21 knots was too slow and asked whether even 12-inch guns were enough. Observers also debated long-range salvo fire, fire control, and crossing the T. Less dramatic but equally important lessons concerned bases and trained crews. British planning increasingly distinguished a theater-entry logistics hub such as Singapore from forward operating bases, while navies recognized that new ships and crews required time to become an effective force.
Chapter · 2:13:19-2:18:17
What other navies learned from Tsushima
Foreign observers debated speed, big guns, salvo fire, bases, theater logistics, and crew readiness after Tsushima.