Soviet capital-ship cancellations and the cost of hunting a Stalingrad

Were the proposed Project 23 and Project 69 conversions abandoned because they were obsolete by the 1950s?

Politics is treated as the main cause, although a slow postwar battleship was less useful than a fast Stalingrad capable of forcing costly enemy countermeasures.

Political decisions dominate this explanation of the proposed Sovetsky Soyuz and Kronshtadt conversions. A 28-knot postwar battleship is nevertheless judged harder to justify than the faster Stalingrad design. A completed Stalingrad could impose substantial costs on an opponent by operating as a distant surface threat. Its quoted 35.5-knot design speed is explicitly conditional: completed ships would have to achieve it, but NATO planners could not safely assume they would fall short. The United States could pair an Iowa with an Essex or Midway, using carrier aircraft to damage or slow the target before the battleship closed. That still commits considerable resources to hunting one ship. Britain and France had far fewer carriers available and would face stronger pressure to build a dedicated counter.