Could Spain build a navy that deters the war of 1898?

With foreknowledge of war in 1898 and five percent of Spain's budget, how could the navy deter the United States without selling the major colonies?

Grant the colonies a stronger political stake, sustain Spanish yards with regular modern warship orders, reform training and personnel, and retain older capital ships as guard or reserve units; the combined political and naval program may deter the war altogether.

The scenario begins in 1875 with foreknowledge of a Spanish-American war in 1898, a protected budget share, and a ban on selling the major colonies. The political proposal gives Cuba and the West Indies representation and voting rights in Spain, while the Philippines would receive a government of its own under Spanish allegiance. Regular warship orders would sustain domestic yards, but training, officer education, personnel reform, and corruption would also affect what the budget could buy. Fleet of Oceans favors a small modern active battle fleet with limited reserves. Clarke argues for retaining more older ships through refits and guard-ship duties, partly because royal names and political expectations would obstruct rapid scrapping. Their eventual compromise combines modern active ships with older vessels kept in reserve or stationed at colonial ports. The intended result is deterrence, though political concessions alone are not guaranteed to settle colonial discontent.