Soviet leaders entered the Winter War expecting a quick victory over a small Finnish military and navy. The campaign instead became an early and brutal test of forces commanded by officers with little time in their posts after the purges. Numbers alone did not solve the operational problems created by Finnish terrain or the shortage of ships available for naval support. The navy also failed to pace its ambitions, pursuing battleships and battlecruisers while repeatedly disrupting the leadership needed to make any programme ready on time. The choice between Project 23 battleships and Project 69 battlecruisers is presented as a counterfactual about priorities: concentrating on one programme might have produced a usable capital ship. Pursuing every capability at once left too little ready when war arrived. The purge and procurement failures became operational weaknesses in Finland.
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The Winter War exposed purges and overambition
The campaign against Finland showed that numbers and grand ship programmes could not compensate for inexperienced commanders, difficult terrain, and forces that were not ready.