Repington rejected the continentalist claim that defeat of Britain's land ally would automatically force London to make peace. Sea control could allow Britain to continue the war until an aggressor released occupied territory, even after a continental reverse. Repington nevertheless reversed his position by 1907, advocating a major military expansion, dismissing the maritime-amphibious strategies of Julian Corbett and Admiral Fisher, and treating the Meuse corridor as the decisive land sector. Lambert's criticism is that this continental emphasis left the Belgian ports undervalued in any war lasting more than six months. German control there could weaken an economic blockade and threaten vital British maritime links. Germany's battle fleet was designed as a diplomatic lever to keep Britain out of a European conflict conducted through Belgium. The Royal Navy's predictable answer was an arms race to retain sea control, repeating the failure of Napoleon III's attempt to coerce Britain with Cherbourg.
Chapter · 45:23-46:59
Why continental defeat did not end Britain's war
Sea control allowed Britain to continue economic and maritime pressure after an ally lost on land, making Belgian ports and Germany's battle fleet central strategic problems.