Political objectives determine which uses of the sea are decisive in a particular war. Cable contrasts denying the Channel to an invasion force in 1588, 1688, or 1940 with the German warships' return through it in February 1942. The latter passage humiliated Britain without deciding the war, so the two kinds of failure had very different consequences. He challenges theories that make command of the sea an end in itself instead of asking what it must accomplish. His criticism extends to Corbett's dismissal of trade destruction as the expedient of an inferior navy and to assumptions that moral objections would prevent attacks on merchant ships. The effectiveness of sea denial has to be judged against the conflict's objectives and the consequences for the opponent.
Notable Point · 1:51:03-1:53:08
Why preventing invasion matters more than every hostile passage
Cable distinguishes decisive control, such as stopping an invasion, from a temporary enemy passage that humiliates a navy without deciding the conflict.